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I. INTRODUCTION
In the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) case
Prosecutor v. Musema, the trial chamber held that an individual could be
found guilty solely for the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide even if
no genocide takes place.' The trial chamber found its jurisdiction to punish
the crime of conspiracy under its establishing statute, but looks almost
exclusively at national legal traditions to determine its content.2 It cites no
* B.A., Philosophy and Political Science, University of Southern California, 2006; J.D.,
Cornell Law School, 2010; LL.M., International and Comparative Law, Cornell Law School, 2010. I
am grateful to Professor Jens Ohlin for his guidance and encouragement, and James Clegg for helping
me flesh out my ideas. Of course I am eternally grateful for my wife who put up with me as I completed
this piece. Thank you.
I. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, 1 194 (Jan. 27, 2000).
2. See id. R 186-191, 196-198, 939.
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other international law supporting its decision to incorporate domestic
concepts into the crime. In contrast, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which relatively recently entered into force, seems to have
intentionally dropped the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide from its
list of crimes under its jurisdiction. This legal and conceptual discord
raises the question of whether conspiracy is actually a legitimate,
substantive, international crime, and whether tribunals should continue to
apply it.
Confusion over the status of conspiracy in international criminal law
may stem from the interplay between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
Conspiracy was most prominently addressed during the Nuremburg Trials
where it was paired with the crime of aggression. The crime of aggression
falls under jus ad bellum. War crimes, like genocide and crimes against
humanity, fall under the category of jus in bello. However, the true issue
threatening the legitimacy of international criminal law is not the confusion
of what type of law conspiracy should fall under, but whether conspiracy
should be made a substantive crime at all. The divergent views of the
common law and civil law traditions are evidence that the crime is not
universal and would be foreign to apply one conception to the other. Not
respecting this difference would threaten the legitimacy of the entire
program.
This paper will attempt to demonstrate that there is no firm foundation
in international criminal law to support conspiracy as a substantive crime
that can stand alone. In Part II, the problem regarding conspiracy as a part
of international criminal law will be presented, particularly through the
ICTR cases of Musema and Nahimana, which will frame the analysis. Each
of those cases claimed that a substantive crime of conspiracy existed in
international law without much discussion of its source or content. Next in
Part III, a general outline of the concept of inchoate crimes will be
presented along with some general concepts that are at the core of the
theory of conspiracy. Most of the work in this discussion will be done in
Part IV where possible sources of a substantive crime of conspiracy in
international criminal law will be investigated. Different sources of
international criminal law will be presented and possible sources of a
substantive crime of conspiracy will be highlighted. Finally, in Part V this
paper will analyze the most pertinent sources presented in Part IV and
assess whether a substantive crime of conspiracy actually exists and
whether such claims as those in the ICTR cases are valid. The ultimate
3. See infra Part IV.B.3.
4. See infra Part IV.D.1.
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goal of this inquiry is to reveal and critique the muddled and haphazard way
that courts have applied legal principles to international criminal law.
II. PROBLEM: IS THERE A SUBSTANTIVE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY?
George Fletcher distinguishes three branches of law that are associated
with conspiracy-two of which have been accepted in international law.5
The first branch he calls the "Nuremberg version," which holds that the
collective planning, preparing, initiating, and waging of aggressive war is a
punishable offense under international law.6 In the second branch, he finds
conspiracy as a component of the complicity in the commission of a
substantive crime.7 These two branches of law, conspiracy as related to the
crime of aggression and mode of liability, have been accepted in
international criminal law. With the third branch we get to the problem;
the third branch is the substantive crime of conspiracy as it is found in the
United States. Fletcher argues that this branch of law has not been adopted
in international law. The status of the concept of conspiracy is unclear and
was most explicitly applied in the ICTR.
A. ICTR Case Musema
Alfred Musema, a director of a state-owned tea factory, was alleged to
have played a crucial role in the Rwandan genocide. In Prosecutor v.
Musema, an ICTR trial court held that conspiracy to commit genocide
should be defined as an agreement between a group to commit genocide.9
The trial court found that the required intent for the substantive crime of
conspiracy to commit genocide is the same intent required for the crime of
genocide, namely the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethical, racial, or religious group as such.'o The trial court states, "[i]t
emerges from this definition that, as far as the crime of conspiracy to
commit genocide is concerned, it is, indeed, the act of conspiracy itself, in
other words, the process ("procidd") of conspiracy, which is punishable
and not its result."" The trial chamber went on to state that a crime of
conspiracy to commit genocide can stand alone even if no genocide took
5. Brief of Specialists in Conspiracy and International Law as Arnici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 7-9, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Fletcher Brief|.
6. See infra Part V.D.; Fletcher Brief, supra note 5, at 7-8.
7. See infra Part V.D.; Fletcher Brief, supra note 5, at 8.
8. Fletcher Brief, supra note 5, at 7-8.
9. See Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, 191.
10. Id. 192.
11. Id. 1193.
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place.12 However, the tribunal noted that if the genocide did occur, the
individual could not be convicted of both a conspiracy to commit genocide
and genocide itself.'3 The defendant would simply be convicted of the
crime of genocide and punishment for conspiring would be consumed by
the substantive crime.
In coming to this conclusion, the Musema trial chamber looked to the
differences in civil and common law jurisdictions to determine the content
of the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide.14  The court first
appropriated the common law actus reus elements for conspiracy. 5 It then
rejected the common law principle that a defendant can be convicted of
both conspiracy and the substantive crime, in favor of the civil law tradition
that once the object crime is committed then there is no reason to punish the
defendant for his rdsolution criminelle or criminal intent.'6 This cherry
picking of doctrines does not follow any rubric and is in essence arbitrary.
They cite to no guiding principles in international law to legitimize their
adoption of various aspects of domestic legal systems. In addition, the
charge of conspiracy is supported by the same set of facts as the object
crime of genocide.' Ultimately, the trial chamber found that the prosecutor
failed to show sufficient evidence of an agreement to commit genocide.' 8 It
is arguable that the trial chamber's real reason for dismissing the conspiracy
charge was because it had enough evidence to convict Musema of the
substantive crime of genocide. 9 This reasoning extends into another ICTR
case that looks to U.S. legal theory to determine the substance of the crime
of conspiracy.
B. ICTR Case Nahimana
In Prosecutor v. Nahimana, the ICTR trial court expanded on the ideas
touched on by the Musema court.2 0 Ferdinand Nahimana was a co-founder
of the radio station Radio T616vision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM).
During the Rawandan genocide, the radio station broadcast information and
12. Id. 194.
13. Id. 198.
14. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, 1 198.
15. Id. 191.
16. Id.In196-98.
17. Id.1937.
18. Id. T 940.
19. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, T 941. See also ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUITER,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 183 (2008).
20. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, T 1048 (Dec. 3, 2003).
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propaganda that was key in the coordination and incitement of the killing of
Tutsis. Nahimana was convicted for failing to use his influence to stop the
radio broadcasts. In the trial court, Nahimana was found guilty of
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and crimes against humanity, and
he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The Appeals Chamber reversed the trial court's conspiracy conviction
that was based on an inference of an agreement. It reiterates the
components of the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide as consisting of
the existence of an agreement between individuals to commit genocide-
actus reus, and the intent to destroy in whole or in part national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group as such-mens rea.2 1 The court notes that an
agreement can be inferred from circumstantial evidence as long as a
conspiracy to commit genocide is the only reasonable inference that can be
made based on the evidence. 22 "Concerted" and "coordinated" action of a
group can constitute circumstantial evidence. The Appeals Chamber
specifically looked to United States case law in determining whether a tacit
agreement satisfies the actus reus requirement.24 The appellate body found
that a reasonable trier of fact could not have found that, based on the
evidence presented, an inference of an agreement to commit conspiracy was
the only reasonable inference to be drawn.2 5 The ICTR has therefore held,
that conspiracy to commit genocide is a substantive crime that stands
alone.26 This holding and the content of the holding seem to clash with
general principles of international criminal law.
III. INCHOATE CRIME THEORY AND CONSPIRACY
A substantive crime of conspiracy is considered to be an inchoate
crime. An inchoate crime is essentially an incomplete crime, i.e. a crime
committed in the course of perpetrating or planning another crime.2 7 This
other, "failed" crime is called the object crime of the conspiracy. The
rationale behind criminalizing inchoate crimes is the idea that the acts
leading up to a crime were steps taken in an effort to do something illegal,
21. Id. 894.
22. Id. 896.
23. Id. 897.
24. Id. 898 (citing lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975)).
25. Nahimana, ICTR-99-52-T, 912.
26. Museuma, ICTR-96-13-T, 194; Nahimana, ICTR-99-52-T, 1044.
27. DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 188 (2010).
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regardless of whether the perpetrator was caught before the actual crime
was committed or not. The seemingly benign acts are not actually so
innocent. There is thus a hope that criminalizing the acts leading up to a
crime will have a deterrence effect on society as a whole.28
Conspiracy is inherently a group crime requiring collective action.
The basis of the crime is the agreement by a group to commit a crime.29
The mens rea element of the crime requires that each member of the
conspiracy must have knowledge of the facts making up the crime the
group intends to commit and the intent to carry out the plan.30 The crime is
almost exclusively found in common law legal systems. Civil law systems
shy away from these types of inchoate crimes.
IV. IF IT EXISTED, WHAT IS ITS SOURCE?
The sources of international law, and similarly international criminal
law, have been listed in Article 38 of the 1945 Statute of the International
Court of Justice. The list provides for four main sources of international
law:
1) International custom;
2) International conventions and treaties;
3) General principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
and
4) Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
The resolutions of international organizations, like the Security Council,
also form a part of international law. Treaty law and customary law are
thought to be of equal validity in that new custom can supersede old
treaties, and new treaties can supersede existing custom. In addition, both
function as a source for the other, e.g. treaty law can "codify" pre-existing
custom or give rise to new customary norms. An example of the interplay
between treaty law and custom is the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which clarified and crystallized existing customary law. When a
treaty's provisions are regarded as a part of customary law, those provisions
are generally applicable to non-parties to the treaty. Here, this paper will
28. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693-94 (1975).
29. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 227 (2d ed. 2008).
30. Id.
31. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
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explore the different sources of international law for a foundation for a
substantive crime of conspiracy.
A. Customary International Law
Simply, customary international law is formed by consistent state
practice combined with opinio juris or a sense of legal obligation that the
consistent state practice is required. State practice is found by looking to
the practice of the international community and assessing whether there is
sufficient consistency, although absolute uniformity is not necessary. The
practices of the states most likely to be affected are the most relevant. The
relevant state practice must be carried out as being required by a legal
obligation. 32 Evidence of a legal obligation can be found in the negative
response to deviations in state practice by the international community.
The strongest form of international law is a form of customary law called
jus cogens. Jus cogens is a preemptory norm that supersedes all other
sources of international law and binds all states regardless of objection.3 3
Most of the main international crimes, e.g. crime of aggressive war, crimes
against humanity, and genocide, make up jus cogens, as well as prohibitions
on apartheid, slavery, and torture.
The most prominent source of international criminal law is the law of
war. The law of war pre-dates World War II and was primarily made up of
customary law. It has slowly been codified by a series of conventions and
treaties that crystallize its provisions. There does not seem to be any
custom in the international realm for holding an individual liable for the
substantive crime of conspiracy. Individuals were not generally held liable
under international law until very recently; international law primarily dealt
with states. Thus, the customary law of war most likely did not have any
provision for conspiracy at the international criminal level. Other sources
that evidence customary law are United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions. These resolutions often evidence opinio juris that can be
coupled with state practice. There is a resolution in particular that
"codifies" the principles in the Nuremberg trials, which is discussed
below.34 The resolution may evidence custom, but it is particularly narrow
and may not comport with state practice as between civil and common law
countries.
32. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44
(Feb. 20, 1969).
33. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
34. See infra Part IV.D.1.
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B. Treaty Law
Treaty law serves as an explicit source of international law and
functions much like either a contract or legislation. Treaty law is a major
source of obligations and rights and is often the most explicit and clear
form of international law. There are a number of treaty regimes and
conventions that specifically deal with international criminal law and the
role of conspiracy within that law. The following are a few of the most
relevant treaty regimes that address or might address the concept of
conspiracy in international law.
1. Laws of War
The laws of war are primarily composed of a number of multi-lateral
treaties. The two main treaty regimes are the Geneva and the Hague
Conventions. The 1949 Geneva Conventions do not refer to conspiracy as
a crime in its contemplation of having individual states enforcing the "grave
breaches" through domestic proceedings.3 ' Therefore, as mentioned above,
the laws of war do not explicitly contain a substantive crime.
2. Genocide Convention
The Genocide Convention is the convention or treaty with the most
prominent use of conspiracy as a substantive crime. The Genocide
Convention includes the charge of conspiracy as a direct response to Nazi
Germany's actions against the Jewish population. Article 3 of the
Convention states:
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide. 37
The Convention makes explicit the crime of conspiracy to commit
genocide and this explicit proclamation is a direct result of the drafters'
abhorrence for genocide and desire to criminalize even the planning of a
35. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129-30,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
36. See infra Part V.A.
37. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 3, Dec. 9,
1948 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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genocide. Many of the provisions in the Genocide Convention have
become a part of customary law, and it is possible that Article 3, cited
above, has become a part of customary law since it has been adopted in the
statutes establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the ICTR-although it was not adopted in the
International Criminal Court (ICC)."
3. Statutes Establishing the International Tribunals and Courts
The various statutes that establish the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC are
also a place to look for the concept of conspiracy as a substantive crime.
These statutes were either created through Security Council resolutions or
through the multi-lateral treaty process, and are based on existing
international law.
The 1945 London Charter of the International Military Tribunal is the
statute that gives the Nuremberg tribunal jurisdiction over various crimes
that include a conspiracy component. Article 6 of the London Charter
provided the jurisdiction of the tribunal and enumerated crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as acts falling within the
jurisdiction of the court.39 Article 6 goes on to state: "Leaders, organizers,
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of
a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such
plan."40 The purpose of this phrase was to allow the tribunal to reach back
to pre-war acts committed against German Jews in the years from 1933 to
1939.
This type of conspiracy principle was inserted by U.S. lawyer Murray
Bernays who thought that the entire Nazi party should be treated as a gang
of criminals who seized the government in Germany and used the power of
the state as a tool to carry out their illegitimate ends. Both French and
Russian delegates, representing civil law countries, at the London debates
disagreed with the concept because the civil law countries do not have a
similar concept. They were particularly abhorred by the fact that each
individual would be responsible for all acts committed by the group simply
through an agreement and nothing else. This extended form of liability
would mean that one lowly Nazi guard would be responsible for millions of
murders.
38. CASSESE, supra note 29, at 228.
39. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 284 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
40. Id.
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Later, both major ad hoc tribunals established in the 1990s would have
the crime of conspiracy incorporated into their jurisdiction through the
crime of genocide. The statutes establishing these tribunals and courts
include jurisdiction over violations of the law of war. The Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia states that
"conspiracy to commit genocide" is a crime within the tribunal's
jurisdiction.4 ' The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda provides for the same exact crime42-both being derived from the
Genocide Convention.43 The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
establishing a court to try individuals for war crimes who were involved in
the Sierra Leone Civil War, provides that "[a] person who planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of
the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.'"
Crimes falling under that court's jurisdiction include crimes against
humanity45 and violations of the Geneva Conventions;" however, the
statute does not provide for jurisdiction over the crime of genocide or
conspiracy to commit genocide explicitly.
The Rome Statute,47 which establishes the International Criminal
Court, adopted every part of the Genocide Convention, except for the part
regarding conspiracy. 48 Article 6 of the Rome Statute eliminates the
conspiracy prong of the crime of genocide:
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
41. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 4(3)(b), May
25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1193 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
42. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 2(3)(b), Nov. 8, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
43. See supra Part IV.B.2.
44. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 6(1), Jan. 16, 2002, S.C. Res. 1315
[hereinafter SCLC Statute].
45. Id. art. 2.
46. Id. art. 3.
47. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 2187
U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
48. Antonio Cassese, Genocide, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY 347 (Cassese, Gaeta & Jones eds., 2002).
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(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; or
(e) Forcibl transferring children of the group to another
group.
This omission is likely a signal that the drafters did not think it prudent to
include conspiracy. The signal may be pointing to the fact the drafters did
and do not consider a substantive crime of conspiracy as being a part of
international criminal law. This recent omission in the creation of a new
legal regime raises the issue to a new level.
C. General Principles ofLaw: Domestic Law
Courts can use general principles of law to fill gaps in international
law that will help make sense of the entire legal schema. General principles
of law carry less weight and are quite controversial in international law
because of their uncertain states. There is a strong preference for treaty and
customary law because they are thought to better capture the spirit of the
law most consented to by most nations. If international law, through
treaties or custom, fails to provide an appropriate standard or guide for a
court, then a court may look to the domestic legal systems for guidance in
determining appropriate standards. In the case of international conspiracy,
there has been much focus on the domestic approaches to conspiracy,
especially the differences between the common and civil law traditions.
Many international courts and commentators look to the U.S. legal
system for guidance or a reference point. In the United States, conspiracy
is a substantive crime in addition to being a mode of liability.so The U.S.
federal code, 18 U.S.C. § 371, provides for three basic elements for the
crime of conspiracy. There are other conspiracy statutes in the federal
code," but this one best outlines the main elements. These elements
include:
1) An agreement to achieve an unlawful objective must exist;
49. Rome Statute, art. 6.
50. See Allison M. Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L.
REv. 75, 118-19 (2005).
51. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (2009). "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the
offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." Id.
2010] 11
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2) The defendant must knowingly and voluntarily participate
in the conspiracy; and
3) There needs to be an overt act committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy. 52
However, many statutes, both federal and state, and the common law
omit the overt act requirement." The first element is usually considered the
plurality requirement and the third element, the overt act requirement. It is
this third requirement that distinguishes the crime of conspiracy from the
mere discussion of a crime under federal law. It is taking the thoughts and
putting them into action. That simple act condemns the whole group, even
if others in the conspiracy do nothing. To avoid liability, a conspirator
must take active steps to get out of the conspiracy, but that may not be
enough. If the group succeeds in committing the object crime, they can still
be charged with conspiracy as a substantive crime in addition to being
charged with the object crime.54 Thus, conspiracy does not combine with
the object crime to create one substantive crime, but remains its own crime.
As a mode of liability, conspiracy can be used to convict a defendant
for the substantive crimes of the defendant's co-conspirators. Shortly after
the adoption of the Nuremberg Charter, the U.S. Supreme Court
incorporated conspiracy as a mode of liability into federal criminal law.
Pinkerton v. United States55 held that each conspirator is responsible for all
reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by the group in the furtherance of
the conspiracy. This form of responsibility is known as "Pinkerton
Liability." Under Pinkerton liability, a large conspiracy with many acts
going on in different places can produce a large number of crimes that an
individual is liable for. Prosecutors in the United States use conspiracy as a
powerful weapon to leverage and convict defendants in criminal
organizations, providing many substantive and procedural advantages. 6
Pinkerton liability is very broad and captures all the members of the
conspiracy without differentiating the level of participation in the
furtherance of the plan. Pinkerton liability is not a part of many U.S. state
jurisdictions, the Model Penal Code, and civil law jurisdictions.5 ' The third
category of the joint criminal enterprise doctrine is similar to this form of
52. United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d 625, 628 (11 th Cir. 1986).
53. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963.
54. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975).
55. 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
56. See LuBAN, ET AL., supra note 27, at 519 for a list of advantages conspiracy provides for
federal prosecutors in the United States.
57. Id. at 880.
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liability, but a wholly separate mode of liability. 8 The doctrine of joint
criminal enterprise is different from Pinkerton liability in that it does not
impose automatically, and generally apply, liability to all members of the
group. 59 It requires a case-by-case analysis of the participation of each
member of the group.o
The civil law tradition, especially in continental Europe, does not
include the substantive crime of conspiracy. An illustrative example of a
civil law approach is the 1930 Italian Penal Code that states, "[s]o far as the
law does not provide to the contrary, if two or more persons agree to
commit a criminal act and the act is not committed, no one may be
punished for the simple fact of the agreement."61 The Musema court
claimed to have found a comparable concept to conspiracy called complot
in the civil law tradition; however, this claim seems dubious.6 2 It is well
settled that civil law systems do not favor inchoate crimes like the Anglo-
American style conspiracy doctrine.
D. Judicial Decisions
Judicial decisions can also be a source for international law, although
they are somewhat secondary to both custom and treaty law. For instance,
the Statute for the International Court of Justice states that the Court's
decisions do not have precedential effect.6 3 Judicial law at the international
level most closely reflects a civil law tradition, rather than a common law
tradition using precedent. International courts and tribunals have limited
jurisdiction as defined in their founding charters or statutes. They are
generally considered to be lacking the power to create new law to fill gaps
in international law-although using the various sources of international
law creatively would allow a court to deal with ambiguities. Only the most
relevant international court decisions pertaining to the law of criminal
conspiracy are presented here.
1. International Military Tribunals
In United States v. Goering, the defendants were charged with "Crimes
against Peace by the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of
58. See Fletcher Brief, supra note 5, at 7 ("[The international doctrine of 'joint criminal
enterprise ... has nothing to do with crime of conspiratorial agreement.").
59. Id. at 21-22.
60. Id.
61. Codice Penale [C.p.] § 115 (1930) (Italy).
62. See infra Part V.
63. ICJ Statute, art. 59, Dec. I1, 1946.
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aggression" and "War Crimes" and "Crimes against Humanity," as well as
"participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or
conspiracy to commit all these crimes."6 The court's analysis contains
references to both "conspiracy" and "common plan" to commit war crimes.
The evidence presented by the prosecution was offered to support the
charges of both conspiring and the common plan, as well as the charges of
planning and waging war.65 The scope of the conspiracy in this case
spanned twenty-five years, beginning with the formation of the Nazi
party--creating a huge class of possible defendants. The court quotes the
prosecution that states, "any significant participation in the affairs of the
Nazi Party or Government is evidence of a participation in a conspiracy that
is in itself criminal."67 It uses this expansive definition of the conspiracy to
levy liability on a wide group of individuals and to deal with the problem of
organizational responsibility.68 Nonetheless, the court notes that the only
substantive crime of conspiracy is that related to the crime of aggressive
war.6 9 Here, the defendants were charged with the crime of conspiracy
even though the substantive crime, i.e. aggression, had occurred. This trial
was not a case of a failed attempt at starting an illegal war where conspiracy
stood alone.
The substantive law of Nuremberg was not considered genuine
international crimes until 1950 when the United Nations General Assembly
declared them to be universal principles of international law. 7 0 The only
mention of conspiracy in the 1950 United Nations Nuremberg principles is
the mention in relation to "crimes against peace:"
(a) Crimes against peace:
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements, or assurances;
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).7 1
64. United States v. Goering, 22 IMT 411, 411 (Int'l Mil. Trib., Sept. 30, 1946), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edulimt/09-30-46.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
65. Id. at 466.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 366 (1994).
69. Goering, 22 IMT at 468.
70. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (July 29, 1950).
71. Id. at Principle Vl(a).
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Here the mention of conspiracy is probably as a mode of liability to the
crime of aggression, not as a substantive crime on its own. No mention of
conspiracy is found under later subsections outlining war crimes or crimes
against humanity.
The form of liability that has arisen out of the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) refers to the collective planning, preparing, initiating, and
waging of aggressive war.7 2  George Fletcher analyzes the inclusion of
conspiracy in the IMT as it applies to the crime of aggression as not adding
anything to the substance of the crime.73 He states that the crime of
aggression is inherently a crime of collective action-an inherent
conspiracy.74 Conspiracy is not doing any of the work in the description
and it is a redundant charge. Therefore, the substantive crime of conspiracy
to commit a crime of aggression is only criminalized if the crime of
aggression does not happen. Once the plan comes to fruition, the crime of
aggression absorbs the crime of conspiracy.7 s
In the Tokyo Tribunal, the court found one defendant, foreign minister
Shigemitsu, guilty of the crime of aggression, but acquitting him of
76
conspiracy. In another case, the tribunal found defendant ambassador
Shiratori guilty of conspiracy and acquitted him of the crime of
aggression. The convictions were also tried in the context of a successful
commencement of a war of aggression.
2. Ad Hoc Tribunals
As described above in Part II, the ICTR in the Muesma and Nahimana
cases have addressed the issue of criminal conspiracy as it pertains to the
crime of genocide. Another ICTR case where the concept of conspiracy
was employed was in the Kambanda case, where the same trial chamber as
the one that heard the Musema case held that the defendant was guilty, after
temporarily pleading guilty, of both genocide and conspiracy to commit
genocide.79 Jean Kambanda was the interim Prime Minister of Rwanda,
72. Fletcher Brief, supra note 5, at 8.
73. Id. at 14.
74. Id.
75. CASSESE, supra note 29, at 161, 228.
76. Patrick Clancey, IMTFE Judgment, (English Translation), HyperWar Foundation, 1 1193-
96 (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-10.htm.
77. Id. at 1200-01.
78. See supra Part II.
79. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, Part IV (Sept.
4, 1998).
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and was accused of distributing weapons with the knowledge that they
would be used in genocide. A similar result was reached in the Niyitegeka
case where the defendant, Minister of Information in the Interim
Government and participant in attacks on Tutsi refugees, was found guilty
of both crimes.80
The ICTY has and is currently trying defendants for conspiracy to
commit genocide. For instance Zdravko Tolimir, Assistant Commander for
Intelligence and Security of the Bosnian Serb Army, is currently being tried
for, inter alia, genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide for events that
took place in Srebrenica.8 ' In addition, the trial chamber in Prosecutor v.
Popovid is expected to render judgment on June 10, 2010, where four
defendants are charged with, inter alia, genocide and conspiracy to commit
genocide.82 The charges allege that the men entered an agreement with
others with the intent to kill and cause physical and mental harm to
Muslims in Srebrenica, with the purpose to destroy, in part, a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such. 3 The plan came to fruition in the
Srebrenica Massacre which did actually take place in July 1995, resulting in
thousands of deaths and the displacement of thousands of refugees.84 The
court's analysis of the conspiracy charge will provide useful insight into its
status in international criminal law.
Conspiracy has most often been used in the ad hoc tribunals as part of
the conceptual development of a mode of liability in international criminal
law. The Anglo-American concepts of conspiracy have been incorporated
into the ICTY and the ICTR and have been blended with the civilian
doctrines of accomplice liability to create the doctrine of joint criminal
85
enterprise. The ICTY has discussed conspiracy as a mode of liability in
comparison to joint criminal liability; for example in the Prosecutor v.
Milutinovid case where Dragoljub Ojdanid challenged the court's
jurisdiction. 6 The ICTY emphasizes that the two modes of liability are
80. Prosecutor' v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-R75, Decision on Motion for
Clarification, %1 459, 480, 502 (June 20, 2008).
81. Zdravki Tolimir, Case information Sheet, "Srebrenica" (IT-05-88/2), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tolimir/cis/en/cis-tolimir-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
82. Popovi6 et al., Case Information Sheet, "Srebrenica" (IT-05-88), available at
http://www.icty.orglx/cases/popovic/cis/en/cis popovic-al-en.pdf(last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. LUBAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 188.
86. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Motion Challenging
Jurisdiction, 23 (May 21, 2003) (Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-
Joint Criminal Enterprise).
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very different, stating: "while mere agreement is sufficient in the case of
conspiracy, the liability of a member of a joint criminal enterprise will
depend on the commission of criminal acts in furtherance of that
enterprise."8 7 Ojdani6 was charged both as a superior 8 and for planning,
instigating, ordering, committing, and otherwise aiding and abetting in the
planning, preparation, or execution of those crimes. 89 Most of the ICTY
cases address conspiracy as a mode of liability. The pending cases
described above should be enlightening as to how this court treats
conspiracy as a substantive crime.
3. Juridic Writings
As a side note to the actual law described above, certain writings and
draft laws may be helpful in interpreting the current state of international
criminal law. The International Law Commission is charged with the
"promotion of the progressive development of international law and its
codification."90 The United Nations General Assembly established the
Commission in 1948. The Commission has created a number of treaty
regimes, including the Vienna Conventions, as well as creating the Rome
Statute establishing the ICC. Article 2 of the International Law
Commission's Draft Code of Crimes states: "An individual shall be
responsible for a crime set out in article 17, 18, 19 or 20 if that individual: .
. . directly participates in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime
which in fact occurs." 91 In this formulation, conspiracy is only punishable
if the object crime "in fact occurs." This would preclude conspiracy from
being an inchoate crime that can stand alone; however, it seems to comport
with the practice of past international courts.
V. ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION
The use of conspiracy as an inchoate crime has varied over the decades
and in the variously constituted courts; however, any use in international
criminal law was likely impermissible and was a misapplication of the
concept. Through surveying the various sources of the inchoate crime of
conspiracy, it is clear that the theory is convoluted and there is much
ambiguity as to its status. One main source of confusion is the conflation of
87. Id.
88. ICTY Statute, art. 7(3).
89. ICTY Statute, art. 7(1).
90. Establishment of an International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (11) (Nov. 21, 1947).
91. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2(3)(e) (1996)
(appearing in the Yearbook ofthe International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two)).
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conspiracy as a substantive crime and conspiracy as a mode of liability. As
stated earlier, conspiracy as a mode of liability is most likely a part of
international criminal law. In those cases, the object crime must have been
committed for liability to flow to the defendant. Nonetheless, a substantive
crime of conspiracy most likely is not a part of international criminal law,
or to the extent it is used by international tribunals, it is misapplied and the
tribunals are acting ultra vires. Some commentators seem to think that the
principles of conspiracy law are nonexistent in international law
altogether. 92 The disconnect between decisions in the ICTR and the Rome
Statute, omitting conspiracy from its jurisdiction, suggest that this problem
had not been resolved and may persist into the future.
Examining the possible sources of a substantive crime of conspiracy
produces various rationales for why there is no substantive crime of
conspiracy in international criminal law. The first is the scarceness of the
concept in international treaty law and in the statutes establishing the
international courts and tribunals. Although many of the statutes
establishing the international tribunals provide for a crime of conspiracy as
related to a particularly heinous object crime, e.g. genocide and aggression,
these principles are not given any substance by the statutes and the charge
is rarely levied in cases where the object crime did not occur. In addition,
the trend seems to be to move away from having a substantive crime of
conspiracy in the statutes as is the case with the Rome Statute. Further, the
crime of conspiracy is not likely a part of customary law because of the
inconsistency of practice given the divergent positions of the civil and
common law legal systems. Applying a principle that is rejected by most
legal systems around the world seems to be unfair and violates the principle
of non crimen sine lege, which is needed to maintain legitimacy.
The IMT seems to be the most prominent source for finding
conspiracy in international law. However, as pointed out by commentators,
the London Agreement of 1945 was created after the crimes had been
committed. 93 Thus any conviction of a conspiracy was used in the context
of completed substantive crimes. No defendant in the Nuremberg IMT was
convicted of conspiracy as a sole substantive crime.94 This is a common
trend in international criminal law. The use of conspiracy at Nuremberg
was more for "shock value and [a] moral message." 95
The Tokyo Tribunals and the ICTR seem to be the only courts to
recognize conspiracy as a substantive offense that can stand alone from the
92. See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 189, 859.
93. CASSESE, supra note 29, at 227.
94. Id. at 197.
95. See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 75-76.
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object crime. Although the Genocide Convention provides for a
substantive crime of conspiracy, and the main tribunals have jurisdiction to
try this crime, actually applying the principle may be a mistake. The
content and substance of the crime is unclear and requires the courts to
reach beyond established international law to attempt to deal with the
foreign concept. In particular, the ICTR case law poses a number of
problems in applying the principle of conspiracy as a substantive crime.
In the midst of trying to determine the content of the crime of
conspiracy the court engaged in questionable reasoning. First, the Musema
court also strangely said it would adopt "the definition of conspiracy most
favorable to Musema."96 Why would a court do this? What principle of
law were they applying here? This seems arbitrary and has no clear basis in
settled international law. In doing so, the Musema trial chamber conflated
different concepts from common and civil law traditions. It purported to
find common law concepts of conspiracy within the civil law tradition.97 It
claimed that the concept of complot as it exists in the civil law tradition is
similar to the common law concept of conspiracy. Complot is punishable
with regard to extremely serious crimes like threatening state security.99
The court presumably only seemed to be citing to French law.'00
Commentators of the court criticize its lack of citations to sources of the
civil law concepts that it uses.'0 ' In addition the court has not been
consistent in applying the principle. There is a conflict between the
Musema court stating that an individual cannot be convicted of both
conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide, and the Kambanda court that
found a defendant guilty of both conspiracy and the object crime. This
disconnect highlights the haphazard nature of the ICTR's rulings.
So far, the ICTY has resorted to the doctrine of joint criminal
enterprise, not an American style conspiracy charge in its cases; however, it
will be interesting to see how the ICTY deals with the conspiracy charges
in its pending cases. The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise seems better
equipped to be employed by international courts and tribunals to extend
liability. The doctrine incorporated elements of conspiracy into its
definition. Involvement in a "common plan" under the doctrine of joint
criminal enterprise is much broader than the mode of liability of conspiracy.
96. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, 198.
97. ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 19, at 184.
98. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, 1 186.
99. Id.
100. ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 19, at 184.
101. Id.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in on whether there is an
international substantive crime of conspiracy, particularly looking to the
laws of war. The laws of war are the precursors to international criminal
law and it is pertinent to discover whether the foundational principles of
international criminal law contain such a substantive crime. In an amicus
curiae brief filed in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeldl02 case, George Fletcher
argued that the laws of war do not include the substantive crime of
conspiracy. o In that case, the defendant Hamdan was charged in a military
commission with conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism. The commissions
only have jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
for offenses established by statute or by the laws of war.'0 Since Congress
had not granted a military commission explicit jurisdiction to try cases of
conspiracy, the only head of jurisdiction available to the commissions
would be the laws of war. Fletcher then goes through the development of
the laws of war since the creation of the IMT and comes to the conclusion
that the substantive crime of conspiracy is not a part of it. Fletcher claims
that the substantive crime of conspiracy is neither found in international
customary law or in treaty law governing the laws of war, especially
pointing to the Geneva and Hague Conventions.'0o Justice Stevens writing
for a plurality agrees with Fletcher and finds, through statute and common
law, that conspiracy is not a part of the law of war, and thus the military
commissions do not have jurisdiction to try Hamdan.'0o Nevertheless, the
outcome of the case did not turn on this fact because Justice Kennedy did
not join this part of Stevens' opinion, which made it a plurality.'0o George
Fletcher describes the references to conspiracy in the Genocide Convention
and the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR as "the afterglow of a dying
concept."' 0 '
The divergence in the approaches of the common law and the civil law
systems creates a major problem in adopting conspiracy as a substantive
crime, regardless of whether the contours of the crime are clearly defined.
It is true that in most common law legal systems, the substantive crime of
conspiracy exists; therefore, a group of individuals is guilty of a substantive
102. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
103. Fletcher Brief, supra note 5, at 8.
104. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1998).
105. Fletcher Brief, supra note 5, at 10-13.
106. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 595-612 (J. Stevens opinion).
107. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 655 (J. Kennedy opinion).
108. Fletcher Brief, supra note 5, at 12.
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offense as soon as they agree to commit a criminal act.' 09 However, George
Fletcher puts it simply, "[c]onspiracy is foreign to every legal system
outside the English-speaking world."" 0 Civil law countries use other legal
devices to accomplish the same goals as the common law states do with the
concept of conspiracy."' Civil law, or civil law-like, countries constitute a
substantial part of the world's legal systems. Most of South America,
Africa, Asia, and almost all of Europe have civil law systems, including
Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Germany. The common law is
primarily limited to the English-speaking world.1 2 This disparity should
counsel against the adoption of a minority principle into international
criminal law.
VI. CONCLUSION
After examining the jumble of sources for the concept of the
substantive crime of conspiracy in international law, we have seen that the
overlapping and sometimes contradictory norms create great confusion that
is often exacerbated by the international courts and tribunals. Because it
has been demonstrated that the existence of a substantive crime of
conspiracy in international criminal law is dubious, and most likely wrong,
courts should not employ it in their reasoning. This area is continuing to
develop and the move taken by the Rome Statute of removing the crime of
conspiracy from its jurisdiction is a step in the right direction. International
criminal law should best comport with the legal concepts that a majority of
the world would expect to be bound to remain a legitimate legal system.
109. In some jurisdictions, more than a mere agreement is required. The legal system requires
some act to further or commence the planned crime.
110. Fletcher Brief, supra note 5, at 15.
111. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 221 (1978).
112. The common law is essentially only used in the British Commonwealth and the United
States.
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